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Abstract
In self-defense cases of battered women who kill their abusive husbands, defendants have
used Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) expert testimony to help justify their acts of
self-defense. However, past research demonstrates that BWS is ineffective in persuading
jurors because it pathologizes the defendant rather than rationalizing her behavior.
Additionally, BWS highlights passive (i.e., stereotypical) features of a battered woman,
and such testimony may not apply to a defendant with active (i.e., atypical) features of a
battered women. The current study hypothesized that another type of expert testimony,
Social-Agency Framework (SAF), will persuade jurors to render more lenient verdicts,
and that the defendant’s passive or active response history will affect verdict decisions.
Additionally, a meditational model predicted that the effect of mock jurors’ gender on
verdict decisions will be mediated by their attitudes toward battered women. In a
3(expert testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) x 2(response history: passive vs. active) x
2(gender: male vs. female) model, jury-eligible participants (expected N = 510) recruited
from the website mTurk answered a survey measuring their attitudes toward battered
women, read a mock trial transcript, and rendered a verdict. The results indicated nonsignificant findings for the effects of expert testimony and response history on verdict
outcomes. A full mediation was found, indicating that gender acted as a proxy for jurors’
attitudes, influencing their verdict decisions. This study has strong legal implications that
highlight the prevailing effect of attitudes and how those attitudes may override the
effects of expert testimony and defendant response history.
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Abused Women who Kill: Juror Perspectives on Self-Defense Theories
Domestic violence pervades the lives many woman, far greater than those of men.
Of the total homicides that occurred in the United States between the years of 1976 and
2005, 35% of the victims were killed by an intimate partner. Of that 35%, 30% of the
victims were women. Between 1993 and 2007, intimate partner homicides amounted to
14% of all recorded homicides with 70% of the victims being female. Considering the
gender disparity in domestic homicide victims, the law needs to specifically address
whether to penalize women who defend themselves against domestic violence (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2009). Should the law view a woman who kills her abusive spouse in
self-defense in the same manner as it does a woman who kills a stranger in self-defense?
Self-defense
Connecticut jury instructions for self-defense, from which the current study
adapted its stimulus material, defines self-defense as: “[1] a person is justified in using
reasonable physical force upon another person to defend [herself] [2] from what [she]
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and [3] [she] may
use such degree of force which [she] reasonably believes to be necessary for such
purpose” (Conn. Criminal Jury Instructions ch. 2.8-1, § 53a-19, 2010). Self-defense
consists of two reasonable belief determinations made by the trier of fact: that the harm
was imminent and that the use of deadly force was necessary to defend from harm. The
Court requires a subjective-objective test, meaning that in order to determine if selfdefense occurred, the jury must both subjectively and objectively apply the law. The
subjective aspect refers to considering the perspective of the defendant (e.g., what the
defendant sincerely believed). The objective part evaluates whether the defendant’s
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actions were reasonable, and not irrational, under the circumstances. In other words,
would a reasonable person share similar beliefs as the defendant given the defendant’s
circumstances? Taken from the Connecticut Judicial Branch, self-defense consists of the
following four elements:
1. The defendant actually believed that someone else was using or about to use
physical force against [her]. If you have found that the force used by the
defendant was deadly physical force, then this element requires that the defendant
actually believed that the other person 1) was using or about to use deadly
physical force against [her], or 2) was inflicting or about to inflict great bodily
harm upon [her].
2. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant's
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant's perspective,
would have shared that belief.
3. The defendant actually believed that the degree of force [she] used was necessary
to repel the attack. Again, if you have found that the force used by the defendant
was deadly physical force, then this element requires that the defendant actually
believed that deadly physical force was necessary to repel the attack.
4. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant's
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant's perspective,
would have shared that belief (Conn. Criminal Jury Instructions ch. 2.8-1, § 53a19, 2010).
The state of Connecticut places the burden of proof solely on the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. The
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defense need only raise the issue of self-defense during trial. The prosecution may meet
its burden by disproving at least one of the aforementioned elements of self-defense.
The subjective-objective test arose from a history of legal modification of the
defense. Before the subjective test was suggested, the jury was instructed to view
battered women in the same manner as the average person, and thus apply the same
definition of “reasonable beliefs” to both categories of people. Some states have
transitioned from a solely objective test to a subjective-objective test. For example, in
State v. Kelly (1984), the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division held that the
“reasonableness” clause in self-defense cases, in which the defendant must have defended
herself as any reasonable person would have, applies to women suffering from Battered
Woman Syndrome (BWS) differently than it does to the general population. In this case,
the defendant Kelly claimed violent beatings from her husband over a period of seven
years. One day her husband continuously assaulted and chased her. The defendant
believed that he intended to kill her, so she withdrew a pair of scissors from her purse and
fatally stabbed him. At trial, defense proffered a self-defense case and requested that an
expert witness testify about the defendant having suffered from BWS. The trial court
ruled the expert testimony as inadmissible because it was irrelevant. On appeal, the judge
reversed the admissibility ruling, stating that the “reasonableness” test applied in selfdefenses must conform to the limited psychological perspective of the afflicted defendant
at the time of the charged act, and imposed a subjective standard of self-defense based on
the defendant’s viewpoint. Thus, in the state of New Jersey, expert testimony on BWS
should be admissible in self-defense cases in order to address the defendant’s perspective,
which lies outside the ken of the jury.
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In 1996, the issue of BWS expert testimony similarly appeared in the California
Court of Appeals in People v. Humphrey. The defendant, Humphrey, had undergone
frequent beatings by her live-in boyfriend. The boyfriend had shot at her, and missed, the
night before the self-defense incident. The next day Humphrey fatally shot him and
claimed self-defense. An expert witness testified to her psychological state at the time of
the killing and stated that the defendant suffered from BWS. The trial court instructed
the jury that although it may consider expert testimony to determine if the defendant
genuinely believed deadly force was necessary, the jury could not use the expert
testimony as evidence in determining whether that belief was reasonable. The California
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling, but the Supreme Court of California reversed the
judgment, holding that BWS expert testimony provides relevant evidence regarding
reasonableness and the subjectiveness of a defendant’s belief to defend herself.
Therefore, a California jury may consider the expert testimony when deciding both
questions of genuine belief of imminent harm and reasonableness of that belief.
California courts hold that the expert testimony is relevant to the defendant’s credibility
because it dispels common misconceptions that a battered woman may choose to leave
her abuser at any point. The cases of New Jersey and California demonstrate that some
states have legitimized the use of expert testimony in self-defense cases to shed light on
the subjective component of “reasonableness.”
History of BWS
Lenore Walker developed the idea of Battered Woman Syndrome in an effort to
increase awareness of intimate partner violence against women (Walker, 1979). The
theory consists of two characteristics of an abusive relationship: the cycle of violence

Running head: ABUSED WOMEN WHO KILL

6

theory and learned helplessness. Walker’s cycle of violence breaks down a battered
woman’s intimate relationship into three stages: tension-building, acute battering, and
loving contrition. The tension-building stage manifests when the couple bickers and the
tension between the two partners gradually increases along with the frequency of verbal
arguments. The acute-batting stage is an incident in which the batterer reaches the zenith
of his aggression and violently attacks his partner in an uncontrollable rage. The final
stage of the cycle, loving contrition, is characterized by the batterer apologizing to his
partner and promising to never hurt her again.
Walker derived the concept of learned helplessness from Seligman and Maier’s
(1967) study. The researchers placed dogs in an apparatus designed to induce electric
shocks. In the escapable condition, the dogs could terminate the shock by pressing a
panel, and in the inescapable condition, the dogs could not terminate the shock. The dogs
in the escapable condition learned to press the panel whereas the dogs in the inescapable
one learned to be helpless. Learned helplessness was corroborated by the second phase
of the study, in which the inescapable dogs were placed in escapable apparatuses. Even
though the dogs had the option to terminate the shock by pressing a panel, they did not
react in any way to the shock. Seligman and Maier (1967) suggested that the dogs failed
to react because they had been conditioned to resign to the pain of the shock. Walker
applied the theory of learned helplessness to battered women. She explained that battered
women’s failed attempts to curb the abuse over time condition them to believe that the
violence is inescapable and thus out of their control. Battered women become more
passive in their response to violence, and, given the cyclical nature of the intimate partner
violence, the women come to view themselves as constantly threatened by imminent
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danger of death of serious bodily harm. BWS expert witnesses testifying in defense of
battered women who kill their abusers submit that the battered woman’s use of deadly
force was reasonable given her constant fear of death or serious harm. BWS expert
testimony also serves to explain why she believed she had no other options than to kill
her abuser (Walker, 1984).
Expert testimony
Legal precedent highlights the significant role expert testimony plays in providing
mitigating evidence in domestic violence cases that the jury otherwise would not have
considered. Maguigan (1991) reviewed 239 appellate cases of women in the U.S. who
killed their abusive partners in self-defense and found that appellate judges had
overturned 40% of those cases based on expert testimony on battering and its effects on
the defendant. Consequently, appellate courts appear to more frequently allow the
inclusion of psychological expert testimony in battered women self-defense cases.
In states that abide by the subjective-objective standard, defense lawyers possess
an advantage in including expert testimony in their cases. Studies show that expert
testimony more effectively persuades jurors to vote in favor of the defendant compared to
providing no expert testimony. Expert testimony aids jurors in contextualizing the
defendant’s killing in a frame of self-defense given her limited psychological and social
state. Otherwise, jurors may inappropriately apply a form of “reasonableness” to
psychologically and socially limited women when it more suitably applies to mentally
and socially stable people (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002). Schuller and Hastings (1996), in
their foundational research for the subject of psycholegal self-defense cases of battered
women, confirmed the advantages of the defense offering some form of expert testimony
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as opposed to none at all. In the condition with no expert testimony, participants
rendered “Guilty” verdicts more often than those in the expert testimony condition.
Schuller, McKimmie, and Janz’s (2004) conducted a similar study that corroborated
Schuller and Hastings’ (1996) findings, suggesting that mock jurors who did not hear any
expert witness testimony were more punitive in rendering their verdict whereas mock
jurors who listened to expert testimony were more likely to render a “Not Guilty” verdict.
Schuller et al. (2004) proposed that defense expert witnesses aid the juror in
understanding the defendant’s limited options in responding to her husband’s abuses.
Without explanation from an authority figure (i.e., the expert witness), jurors may have
more difficulty placing themselves in the shoes of the defendant and thus be unable to
empathize with her.
Although defense attorneys should prefer BWS expert testimony over no expert
testimony, researchers have warned against its use. The term itself, Battered Woman
Syndrome, implies an illness or disorder, which may encourage jurors to look for
“symptoms” of BWS in the defendant’s behavior (Schneider, 1986; Browne, 1987).
Thus, BWS directs jurors to interpret the defendant’s actions within the framework of
dysfunction instead of as an outcome of her environment and mental state (Raitt &
Zeedyk, 2000). For example, BWS expert testimony may focus more on the defendant
suffering from learned helplessness, a psychological dysfunction, as opposed to
discussing how her abuser may have prevented her from obtaining a job, talking to her
friends or family, or seeking help from a community outreach program.
Response history
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BWS invokes the stereotype of a battered woman – passive, irrational, and
“emotionally damaged” (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002). If the defendant did not exhibit the
stereotypical characteristics of a battered woman, then jurors may doubt the credibility of
BWS expert testimony. Many domestically abusive relationships do not exhibit cyclical
violence and Walker’s (1986) own study reveals that only two-thirds of women allegedly
suffering from BWS reported experiencing cyclical violence (Plumm & Terrance, 2009).
Gondolf and Fisher (1988) proposed that rather than developing learned helplessness,
some battered women become more active in attempting to end the violence. Jurors may
consider the BWS expert testimony as irrelevant if the defendant deviated from the
prototypical model of a battered woman (Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Schuller and Rzepa
(2002) examined whether mock jurors rendered punitive verdicts to an “active”
defendant, one who strayed from the prototype of a battered woman, while other mock
jurors rendered lenient verdict to a “passive” defendant, one who conformed to the
battered woman stereotype. They also gave half of the mock jurors nullification
instructions, which suggest that their verdict may be based on their conscience if they felt
that the law as applied to the case would produce an unjust verdict. The researchers
found that when not given the nullification instructions, compared to when given
nullification instructions, mock jurors gave more punitive verdicts when the defendant
was active. The active defendant also received harsher verdicts overall than in the
passive condition. With nullification instructions, the active defendant, compared to the
passive one, received more manslaughter and fewer self-defense verdicts, and without
nullification instructions, the active defendant received more murder verdicts. This
finding demonstrates that battered women defendants will have a difficult time
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convincing the jury of their self-defense claims when they have a response history
incongruent to the jurors’ stereotypical view of battered woman’s behavior.
In these cases, past research has shown that male jurors in general render more
punitive verdicts than female jurors. Russell and Melillo (2006) evaluated the verdicts of
610 undergraduate students and manipulated whether the defendant conformed to the
battered woman prototype (atypical vs. typical) and the defendant’s response history to
the abusive relationship (active vs. passive). The active response history described the
defendant as having fought back to her abusive husband, and the passive response history
indicated a submissive woman who tried to placate her husband. Women assigned
significantly fewer “Guilty” verdicts than men across conditions. Overall, male jurors
believed that the defendant had more options available to her than killing, did not believe
she fit the typology of a battered women, and assumed that the defendant was more in
control of her behavior and emotions at the time of the homicide than did female jurors.
Prototype theory and attitudes toward battered women
Russell and Melillo (2006) expanded upon prototype theory, which argues that
jurors view defendants based on prevailing stereotypes. Typicality describes the degree
of conformance, and it consists of prototypical features. The greater the prototypical
characteristics of a battered woman the defendant possesses, the greater the perceived fit
to a battered woman (Smith, 1991). Mock jurors in the atypical/active defendant
condition rendered more punitive verdicts than in the typical/passive condition, and as a
result, mock jurors perceived greater options available to killing. Respondents believed
that the typical/passive defendant’s story seemed more plausible and that the defendant’s
actions better met the self-defense requirements than did those of the atypical/active

Running head: ABUSED WOMEN WHO KILL

11

defendant. These results suggest that jurors enter the courtroom with preconceived
notions of the characteristics of battered women and selectively search for evidence
confirming or disconfirming that prototype. Therefore, predispositional attitudes may act
as a filter through which jurors evaluate the defendant’s culpability (Terrance &
Matheson, 2003). Russell and Melillo propose that juror decision-making occurs in a
graded structure, in which jurors compare the defendant’s characteristics to that of the
prototypical battered woman, and if sufficient overlap of characteristics exists, then jurors
will find a “Not Guilty” verdict.
Social-agency framework
Past research thus suggests that BWS does not help all abused women who have
killed in self-defense, and its characterization of the defendant may ineffectively persuade
jurors that the law excuses her actions. Recently, researchers have investigated an
alternative type of expert testimony, social-agency framework (SAF). Unlike BWS,
which focuses solely on the woman’s psychological state, SAF emphasizes the social
reality of women in abusive relationships. This type of testimony explains, for example,
the woman’s economic dependency on her abuser, the limitations of the criminal justice
system in restraining the abuser from her, lacking social support in the workplace and
medical, religious, and residential community, fear of child services taking away her
children, and inadequate aid from the police (Barnett, 2001). Additionally, SAF
examines the consequences of the defendant trying to seek help. An abuser may retaliate
against his victim even after she leaves the relationship. Mahoney (1991) described this
event as separation assault, and it occurs so often that a significant number of battered
women killed by their abusive partner were no longer living together at the time of her
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death (Dutton, 1993). SAF explains the lack of options available (or perceivable) to the
abused woman and how she may genuinely fear that her abuser would kill her. This type
of expert testimony directly addresses the reasonableness of fatal self-defense, whereas
BWS focuses on the defendant’s psychological pathology.
Plumm and Terrance (2009) examined the persuasiveness of SAF expert
testimony as compared to BWS expert testimony and no expert testimony. Participants
rendered the most favorable verdicts for the defense in the SAF condition than any other
condition. They also rated the defendant in the SAF condition as having the fewest
alternatives to killing her abuser and as the least typical of a battered woman than in other
conditions.
Plumm and Terrance (2009) also noted gender differences in juror differences
between the SAF and BWS expert conditions. While women overall rated the defendant
as reasonable and justified in her actions, men only rated her actions as reasonable and
justified after hearing the SAF expert testimony. SAF more effectively than BWS aided
men to contextualize the woman’s behavior given her constrained socioeconomic
environment, and hence make male jurors better able to appreciate the reasonableness of
her self-defense. In their study, Schuller, McKimme, and Janz (2004) found that
Canadian male participants rendered a significantly greater number of punitive verdicts in
the condition of no expert testimony than in the expert testimony condition, whereas
female participants’ verdicts displayed no difference between the two conditions.
Defense expert testimony may favorably affect male jurors more than female jurors
because it appears to educate men about the circumstances of domestically abused
women.
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The existing literature on jury decision-making in cases of domestic violence and
self-defense, however, remains small and underdeveloped. Schuller and Hastings (1996)
provided the foundational work from which other researchers have based their expert
testimony and other case materials. However, in many studies, BWS and SAF expert
testimony were not clearly distinct from one another, which may explain why few
studies, excluding that of Schuller and Hastings (1996), were able to find a significant
difference between verdicts in the BWS and SAF expert testimony conditions. In past
studies, SAF expert testimony often included more psychological than social factors,
which make it resemble BWS expert testimony. Consequently, verdicts may have been
confounded with the overlap between the two types of expert testimonies. Furthermore,
no research as of yet has manipulated both the response history (passive vs. active) and
expert testimony type (SAF vs. BWS) in the same experiment. Therefore, the current
study presents a 3x2x2 design: expert testimony (BWS vs. SAF vs. control/none),
response history (passive vs. active), and jurors’ gender (male vs. female).
Hypothesis 1
It is hypothesized that there will be a main effect of gender on verdict decisions,
with female participants rendering more lenient verdicts across all conditions. The
reason is because past studies have shown women to better empathize with battered
women defendants and consistently across conditions (BWS vs. SAF vs. no expert
testimony) render more lenient verdicts.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis predicts a main effect of expert testimony type on verdict
confidence, specifically that participants will render the most punitive verdicts in the
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control condition and the most lenient verdicts in the SAF condition. The control
condition should produce the most “Guilty” verdicts because no psychological or social
explanation is given for the defendant’s actions, which reduces the likelihood of jurors
finding the defendant’s actions as reasonable, a requirement of self-defense. SAF expert
testimony should induce the most “Not Guilty” verdicts because it does not typify a
battered woman as passive, like BWS expert testimony does, and thus readily applies to
both passive and active defendants. Moreover, SAF more effectively explains the social
circumstances of the battered women, which may facilitate men’s understanding of the
battered woman’s actions.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis suggests an interaction between gender and expert
testimony, in which the decrease in “Guilty” verdicts from BWS to SAF expert testimony
condition will be greatest among male jurors than female jurors. Male participants
should be most persuaded by the SAF expert testimony to render “Not Guilty” verdicts.
Women’s verdicts should remain more constant relative to those of men. This interaction
should occur because SAF, as mentioned in the second hypothesis, offers a social-based
explanation of the defendant’s actions instead of a psychologically based one. Previous
studies have shown that BWS pathologizes battered women and reduces the credibility of
a reasonable self-defense. Schuller and Rzepa (2002) demonstrated that jurors overall do
not believe that BWS expert testimony helps to rationalize the defendant’s behavior, but
female jurors remain relatively favorable toward the defendant in both BWS and SAF
expert testimony conditions. Male jurors, on the other hand, tended to believe that SAF
is more suitable to the requirements of self-defense. Thus, the change from “Guilty”
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verdicts in the BWS condition to “Not Guilty” verdicts in the SAF condition should be
largest among men. Women being more victim empathetic, they will have more “Not
Guilty” verdicts in the BWS condition and as a result have less contrasts compared to the
SAF condition in their verdict decisions.
Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis proposes an interaction between expert testimony type and
response history. According to prototype theory, participants in the BWS expert
testimony, passive condition should perceive a greater fit in the defendant’s typicality to
that of a battered woman, and participants in the BWS, active condition should perceive
fewer overlaps between the defendant’s typicality and the prototypical model of a
battered woman. Therefore, participants should render more lenient verdicts in the BWS,
passive condition and more punitive verdicts in the BWS expert testimony, active
condition.
Hypothesis 5
The fifth hypothesis presents a meditational model (see Model 1 in Appendix Q).
The interaction between response history and expert testimony and its effect on verdict
confidence should be mediated by the defendant’s typicality (i.e., degree of perceived fit
to a prototypical battered woman). The interaction between response history and expert
testimony should reflect participants’ positive or negative reactions toward expert
testimony depending on how well the expert testimony explains the defendant’s actions
given her response history. The effect on verdict decisions, though, is not direct, but
rather is mediated by defendant typicality. Mock jurors should interpret the defendant’s
action, as explained by the expert testimony and contextualized by her response history,
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according to how well the defendant’s characteristics fit those of a stereotypical battered
woman. The stronger the perceived fit, the more likely participants will render a lenient
verdict compared to a weak perceived fit.
Hypothesis 6
The sixth hypothesis also proposes a meditational model (see Model 2 in
Appendix Q). The interaction between response history and expert testimony and its
effect on verdict confidence should be mediated by the juror’s perception of expert
witness credibility. Jurors will evaluate the expert witness’s credibility based on the
perceived fit of the defendant’s response history and the expert witness’s explanation of
that response history. If the response history and expert testimony contradict each other,
such as in the case of the BWS expert testimony, active condition, then jurors will find
the expert witness less credible. The expert witness’s perceived credibility should
influence the direction of the verdict because credibility determines the weight of that
testimony as evidence. The lower the credibility, the less likely the expert testimony will
be used as evidence in favor of the defendant. The higher the credibility, the more likely
the expert testimony will be used as evidence in favor the defendant.
Hypothesis 7
Finally, the seventh hypothesis puts forth a third meditational model (see Model 3
in Appendix Q). The effect of the participant’s gender on verdict confidence should be
mediated by their attitudes toward spousal abuse. Attitudes toward spousal abuse are
measured in the context of how much blame the participants assigns to the victim of
domestic violence, how well they empathize with the victim, and the degree of control
the victim has over the abusive relationship. The current research predicts that women
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will share more empathetic attitudes toward battered women and that men will hold
harsher attitudes toward battered women. This effect should occur because women tend
to better empathize with battered women defendants, and such empathy should influence
women’s attitudes toward battered women to be more understanding of the defendant’s
inability to control her partner’s violence. On the other hand, male jurors’ relative lack of
empathy contributes to a negative attitude toward battered women in which they are more
likely to assign blame to the defendant for her actions. Consequently, women with their
more positive attitudes and men with their negative attitudes will lead each gender to
render lenient and punitive verdicts, respectively.

Method
Participants
Participants (N = 593) were recruited from the online survey Mechanical Turk
(mTurk). Completion rate was 86% as a result of 83 participants failing to complete the
survey. After excluding the incomplete responses, the sample size was 510 participants.
Participants, who all have accounts on mTurk, chose to take the survey in return for
monetary compensation. The first 150 responders received twenty cents. In order to
collect more participants at a higher rate, monetary compensation was increased to fifty
cents. There was no statistical significance between verdict confidence scores for the
groups that were paid 20 cents (M = 1.29, SD = 5.41) and 50 cents (M = .43, SD = 5.50),
t(508) = 1.54, p = .73. All participants received a questionnaire asking if they met all the
requirements for jury-eligibility, and 100% were eligible jurors. The high eligibility
percentage is due to several reasons: (1) because of mTurk’s restrictions, only
participants from within the United States and over the age of 18 could access the survey,
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and (2) before accepting to participate, the survey description informed them that only
jury-eligible people may continue. Participants’ age ranged between 18 and 79 years old
(M = 35.89). Participants who were below the age of 30 composed 44.9% of the entire
sample and those 55 and older formed 11.6% of the group. Males totaled 203
participants (39.8%), and women accounted for 307 (60.2%) of the participants.
Approximately 81% of participants were White (N = 413), 5.9% were Black (N = 30),
5.5% were Asian (N = 28), 3.3% were Hispanic (N = 17), and the rest were Other (N =
22).
Procedure
Participants randomly chose a number from one to six and the selected number
directed them to the corresponding condition. Each participant received a written
transcript of the imaginary trial of Ann Hudson, an abused woman who killed her
husband and is claiming self-defense. All were asked to pretend to serve as real jurors.
The participants read the judge’s instructions, both counsels’ opening statements, direct
and cross examinations of prosecution and defense witnesses, and closing statements.
They were then asked a series of questions pertaining to their verdict, perception of the
defendant’s typicality as a battered woman, credibility of the expert witness and
testimony, and their leniency toward battered women. Finally, they answered a
demographics questionnaire.
Expert testimony
The content of the participants’ written transcripts varied according to condition.
In the BWS expert testimony condition, the expert witness says that the defendant
suffered from BWS and explains the psychological characteristics that led the defendant
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to kill her husband (see Appendices E and F). In the SAF expert testimony condition, the
expert witness describes SAF and explains how the defendant’s social circumstances led
her to kill her husband (see Appendices G and H). The opening and closing statements in
each condition make reference to the type of expert testimony presented. The third
testimony condition is a control, in which there is no expert witness testimony, and the
opening and closing statements make no reference to such testimony (see Appendices C
and D).
Response history
The written transcripts also differ in the types of response histories described in
the witness examinations. The defendant’s past history of abuse is depicted as either
passive or active. In the passive condition, the prosecution witness and defendant
provide details of the defendant’s submission to her husband, her willingness to please,
self-blame, and poor attempts at seeking help (see Appendices C, E, and G). In the active
condition, the prosecution witness and defendant offer the opposite impression of the
defendant. They indicate she was more active in seeking help, blamed her husband
instead of herself, and sometimes fought back (see Appendix D, F, and H). The opening
and closing statements do not reference response histories in either condition.
The current study examines the following between-subjects factors in a factorial
design: 3(expert testimony: battered woman syndrome vs. social-agency framework vs.
no expert testimony) x 2(response history: passive vs. active) x 2(jurors’ gender: male vs.
female).
Measures
Verdict
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Jurors offered a verdict (Guilty: -1, Not Guilty: 1), which was multiplied by their
confidence in that verdict, ranging from 1 to 7, to produce their verdict composite score
(range: confidently “Guilty” (-7) to confidently “Not Guilty” (7); see Appendix N).
Attitudes toward spousal abuse and battered women
Adapted from Kirsten Nilsen and Lawrence Wrightsman’s (2003) scale for
Attitudes toward Spouse Abuse and Battered Women, this scale contains 21 items, each
using a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix I). Participants rated the agreeableness of
each statement, such as, “Women can leave abusive relationships if they really want to.”
Twelve of the items were reverse coded and the scores were averaged. Lower scores
suggested conservative views of domestic violence, such as the participant blaming the
woman for staying in the abusive relationship. Higher scores displayed more
sympathetic views toward the abused woman and did not hold her as accountable for her
predicament. Although this scale has not been published, it is the only scale created yet
that measures jurors’ views on battered women who kill. The attitudes scale in the
current study produced a good internal reliability, with Cronbach’s α = .793.
Typicality
Participants answered two questions measuring their perception of whether the
defendant resembled a typical battered woman. This scale aims to investigate prototype
theory, in which jurors compare the defendant’s behavior to that of a prototypical
battered woman. The first item asked a binary (Yes: 0, No: 1) question and the second
provided a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7 (see Appendix K). The Likert scale item
asked, “Does the defendant’s behavior fit with the behavior of a typical battered
woman?” The Likert score was used as a measure of perceived typicality while the
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binary item was used as a check against the Likert scale. Participants who answered
“Yes” on the binary item indicated that they believed the defendant resembled a normal
battered woman, and those who answered “No” did not hold such a belief. Lower scores
on the Likert scale indicate no perceived fit with a stereotypical battered woman and
higher scores suggested a perfect fit. Thus, positive responses on the first question
should positively correlate with the second question’s scored responses higher than 4, and
the inverse should occur with negative responses on the first question.
Self-defense manipulation check
Five questions using a 7-point Likert scale were asked to assess whether
participants applied reasonableness to their verdict decision (see Appendix M). For
example, one question asked participants to rate how much they agree or disagree with
the following statement: “The defendant's belief in imminent harm was reasonable.” One
question was reverse coded, and all the ratings were averaged together to create a selfdefense check averaged score. The significance of this is to see how well the participants
understood the definition of self-defense as it related to their verdict. Lower scores
suggest that the defendant was not reasonable in her action and higher scores indicate
more reasonableness. Therefore, lower scores should correlate with “Guilty” verdicts
and higher scores with “Not Guilty” verdicts. The self-defense scale demonstrated good
internal consistency with α = .874
Response history scale
This 7-item scale measured whether the participant believed the defendant was
active or passive (see Appendix J). To illustrate, one question read, “The defendant had
low self-esteem,” and another read, “The defendant was confrontational.” The statements
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referring to active behaviors (three total) were reverse coded and all seven scores were
combined to form one averaged score. The range of scores was between 1 and 7, lower
scores indicating an active response history and the higher scores indicating a passive
response history. The response history scale produced an acceptable internal consistency,
α = .698.
Expert witness credibility
This scale was adapted from the Witness Credibility Scale (Brodsky, Griffin, &
Cramer, 2010), which previously had been found to be reliable (α = .95). It measures
the participants’ perceived credibility of the expert by asking question such as, “Was Dr.
Baxter trustworthy?” The scale was adapted to the current study and shortened from 20
questions to 11 questions and used a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix L). The Witness
Credibility Scale in the current study similarly produced a high Cronbach’s α = .958, an
excellent internal reliability score.

Results
Typicality scale
A t-test found a significant main effect of the perceived typicality of a battered
woman on response history. Participants in the passive condition believed the defendant
was more typical of a battered woman (M = 5.29, SD = 1.20) than participants in the
active condition (M = 4.74, SD = 1.06), t(508) = 14.59, p < .001.
Self-defense manipulation check
A t-test was conducted to determine the main effect of participants’ perception of
the defendant’s reasonableness on the dependent variable of verdict confidence.
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Participants who voted “Not Guilty” scored significantly higher on the reasonableness of
self-defense (M = 5.57, SD = .89) than those who voted “Guilty” (M = 3.53, SD = 1.17),
t(500) = 22.16, p < .001.
Response history check
The response history check assessed whether participants discriminated between
the active and passive conditions. Participants in the active condition perceived the
active defendant (M = 4.31, SD = 1.09) differently from the passive condition (M = 5.13,
SD = 1.01). The participants rated the defendant as more active in the active condition
and more passive in the passive condition, t(496) = -8.72, p < .001.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis suggested a main effect of jurors’ gender on verdict
decisions, with female participants rendering more lenient verdicts across all conditions.
The results support this hypothesis. A 3(expert testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. none) x
2(response history: passive vs. active) x 2(jurors’ gender: male vs. female) ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect for gender on verdict decisions. Men rendered more
“Guilty” verdicts (M = -.13, SD = .42) and women more “Not Guilty” verdicts (M = 1.30,
SD = .32), F(1, 508) = 7.44, p = .007.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis predicted a main effect of expert testimony type on verdict
outcomes, specifically that participants will render the most punitive verdicts in the
control condition and the most lenient verdicts in the SAF condition. This hypothesis
was unsupported by the data. The 3x2x2 ANOVA showed no main effect for the control
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expert testimony (M = .42, SD = 5.48), BWS (M = .44, SD = 5.70), and SAF conditions
(M = 1.17, SD = 5.42) on verdict decisions.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis suggested an interaction between jurors’ gender and expert
testimony, in which male jurors, more so than women, will render more “Not Guilty”
verdicts in the SAF than BWS condition. The data did not support this hypothesis; no
interaction was found between gender and expert testimony.
Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis proposed an interaction between expert testimony type and
response history, which produced non-significance. Passive (M = .85, SD = 5.48) and
active conditions (M = .47, SD = 5.43) also produced non-significant main effects on
verdict outcomes.
Hypothesis 5
The fifth hypothesis predicted a meditational model, specifically that the
interaction between expert testimony and response history and its effect on verdict
outcome should be mediated by the defendant’s typicality. As stated in the fourth
hypothesis, the interaction between expert testimony and response history was not
significant, and as a result, the meditational model was not supported.
Hypothesis 6
The sixth hypothesis similarly suggested a meditational model, in which the
interaction between expert testimony and response history and its effect on verdict
outcome should be mediated by the juror’s perception of expert witness credibility.
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Because the interaction between expert testimony and response history was not
significant, the meditational model was not supported.
Hypothesis 7
The seventh hypothesis presented another meditational model; the effect of the
participant’s gender on verdict decision should be mediated by their attitudes toward
spousal abuse and battered women. Unlike in the 3x2x2 ANOVA, in which the main
effect of gender on verdict outcome was significant, the main effect produced nonsignificance in a 3x2x2 ANCOVA, with pretested juror attitudes being the covariate.
Only the participants’ attitudes toward spousal abuse was significant, F(1, 508) = 35.71,
p < .001.
In order to test for attitudes as a mediating factor for verdict outcomes, a
regression analysis was first used to determine the correlation between gender and verdict
confidence. Jurors’ gender significantly predicted verdict outcomes, β = .14, t(509) =
3.23, p < .01, and gender also accounted for 2.0% of verdict confidence outcomes, R2 =
.020, F(1, 509) = 10.44, p < .01.
A second regression analysis measured the correlation between attitudes toward
spousal abuse and verdict confidence. Participants’ pretested attitudes significantly
predicted verdict outcomes, β = .29, t(509) = 6.70, p < .001, and their attitudes accounted
for 8.1% of verdict confidence outcomes, R2 = .081, F(1, 509) = 44.89, p < .001.
A third regression analysis determined if the pretested attitudes, when taken into
consideration, would remove the significant correlation between gender and verdict
confidence. As predicted, when taking into account participants’ attitudes toward spousal
abuse, the attitudes were a significant predictor of verdict confidence, β = .27, t(508) =
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5.98, p < .001, and gender was no longer a significant predictor, β =.06, t(508) = 1.38, p
> .10. This model of attitudes and gender explained for 8.4% of verdict confidence
outcomes, R2 = .084, F(2, 508) = 23.43, p < .001.
In the last step to verify full mediation, a fourth regression analysis was conducted
to find the correlation between gender and attitudes toward spousal abuse. Participants’
gender was a significant predictor of their attitudes, β = .30, t(509) = 7.16, p < .001, and
their gender explained 9.1% of the variance in attitudes they held, R2 = .091, F(1, 509) =
51.19, p < .001.
Given these four regression analyses, there was full mediation, in which gender’s
effect on verdict confidence was mediated by participants’ attitudes toward spousal abuse
and battered women (see Appendix R).
Exploratory analyses
The results have yielded no significance for a main effect of response history on
verdict outcomes. Past research suggests, though, that an active response history tends to
be incongruent to the juror’s perception of stereotypical characteristics of a battered
woman. Jurors also interpret expert testimony based on how well it applies to the
defendant. Schuller and Rzepa’s (2002) study revealed that when the expert testimony
did not compliment the prototypical model of a battered woman, jurors believed that the
expert testimony did not help the defendant meet the requirements for self-defense, and
the jurors viewed the expert witness as less credible. A post-hoc hypothesis predicted an
interaction between response history and expert witness credibility; that if the response
history is active, participants should view the BWS expert witness as less credible
because expert witness describes the defendant’s behavior according to passive
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characteristics, which directly contradicts the active response history. If the response
history is active, then the BWS expert witness should be viewed as more credible because
the testimony and passive response history describe the defendant’s characteristics in the
same manner. The SAF expert witness should be viewed as more credible than the BWS
one in both the active and passive response history conditions because it does not rely on
response history as evidence, but rather explains why the defendant’s given social
circumstances led her to behave in self-defense, which jurors, according to past research,
have found more convincing than BWS expert testimony.
To investigate whether response history and perceived expert witness credibility
interacted to affect verdict confidence, a regression analysis was conducted. First,
because of multicollinearity concerns, the Expert Credibility Scale scores along with the
response history scores were centered by subtracting the mean from each of the
independent variables. A regression analysis of the centered variables revealed no
significance for the interaction of response history and expert witness credibility on
verdict confidence. However, significance appeared for expert witness credibility on
verdict confidence. Thus, participants’ perceived expert witness credibility significantly
predicted verdict confidence, β = .37, t(349) = 7.12, p < .001, and credibility accounted
for 13.4% of verdict confidence outcomes, R2 = .134, F(3, 349) = 18.07, p < .001.
In an effort to further understand jurors’ perception of expert witness credibility, a
regression analysis was conducted to determine if the jurors’ attitudes predicted how they
would rate expert witness credibility. The theory behind this analysis is that attitudes
may act as an information filtering mechanism, through which participants select and
interpret evidence that are parallel to their preexisting attitudes. If jurors’ attitudes favor
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the expert testimony, then they should view the expert witness as more credible, and
when their attitudes bias them against the testimony, jurors should view the expert
witness as less credible. The regression analysis revealed that jurors’ attitudes toward
spousal abuse significantly predicted how they rated the expert witness’ credibility, β =
.43, t(350) = 8.84, p < .001. Jurors’ attitudes accounted for 18.3% of their perception of
expert witness credibility, R2 = .183, F(1, 350) = 78.17, p < .001.
Another regression analysis investigated whether age predicted verdict decisions.
This analysis was conducted because the demographics data revealed a highly varied age
group, ranging from 18 to 79 years old. The mean age was 35.89 years old with a
standard deviation of 13.79 years. Given this range, there was a large enough sample size
to compare younger and older adults’ attitudinal differences based on their age. Age may
act as a proxy for attitudes toward spousal abuse because as a person grows older, he or
she may gain more experience with domestic violence, and as a result, be more likely to
hold attitudes empathetic toward the defendant.
Age was split into two groups: people under the age of 30 and those who are age
30 and above. The split in age aimed to categorize people into categories of young adult
and older adult. In order to determine if age acted as a predictor for one’s attitudes
toward spousal abuse and battered women, a regression analysis was run. Age
significantly predicted participants’ attitudes, β = .17, t(509) = 3.82, p < .01.
Specifically, age accounted for 2.8% of participants’ attitudes, R2 = .028, F(1, 509) =
14.57, p < .01. People under the age of 30 (M = 5.10, SD = .79) held more biased
attitudes against battered women than people over the age of 30 (M = 5.24, SD = .82).
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Discussion
Manipulation checks
The self-defense scale showed that participants who voted “Not Guilty” more
likely believed that the defendant beliefs’ and behavior were reasonable and met the
standards of self-defense. Participants who voted “Guilty” were less likely to believe in
the defendant’s reasonableness. This finding suggests that participants understood the
requirements of self-defense and corresponded their verdict decisions to those
requirements. Additionally, the self-defense scale includes both subjective and objective
components of self-defense, indicating that mock jurors noticed the subjective and
objective aspects of self-defense and may have considered both of them in rendering their
verdict.
The response history scale measured whether participants discriminated between
a passive and active defendant. The results suggest that participants perceived a
difference between them, associating more passive characteristics with the passive
defendant, and more active characteristics with the active defendant. This finding shows
that the participants successfully noticed the response history manipulation, but this scale
did not assess whether participants’ decision-making process were differently affected by
the defendant’s response history.
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis predicted a main effect of jurors’ gender on verdict outcomes.
The results support this hypothesis, demonstrating that, across all conditions, female
participants rendered more lenient verdicts, and male participants rendered more punitive
verdicts. While this finding links gender with verdict decisions, it should not be assumed
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that gender on its own causes certain verdict outcomes. Rather, the main effect may
suggest that gender possess different experiences in memory that lead them to interpret
the same information differently. Past research has consistently shown that jurors tend to
better empathize with victims of the same sex. In cases of abuse directed toward women,
female jurors are more victim empathetic than male jurors (Sinclair & Bourne, 1998).
The current study shows that women offer lenient verdicts compared to men who offer
punitive ones. Men and women’s contrasting personal experiences may explain the
gender differences. The statistics presented in the introduction of this paper display the
magnitude of female victims of domestic violence, and the number of male victims is
significantly lower. Women are more likely to be adversely affected by domestic abuse,
and in addition to this increased probability for women than men, women may be more
likely to hear from other women their experiences with domestic violence. Whether in
the form of a statistic, personal experience, or anecdotes from other women, domestic
violence is more accessible in memory for women than in men. The availability heuristic
proffers that easily accessed pieces of memory serve as the immediate, main sources of
information on which to base one’s judgment. Therefore, women, more often than men,
may immediately find in memory a more personal relationship to the battered woman’s
predicament.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis presented a main effect of expert testimony on verdict
confidence, specifying that participants should render the most punitive verdicts in the
control condition and the most lenient verdicts in the SAF condition. The null hypothesis
was supported. Non-significance may suggest that, in actuality, no difference exists
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between BWS and SAF expert testimony. Whether or not BWS seems to pathologize the
defendant, this type of expert testimony has no more negative impact on verdict outcomes
than SAF has.
The subjective-objective standard may also have contributed to the nonsignificance. Mock jurors may have followed the subjective requirements by effortfully
placing themselves in the defendant’s shoes, whether or not they heard any expert
testimony. Consequently, expert testimony may have offered nothing new for the mock
jurors to consider, because participants were already attempting to understand the
defendant’s point of view.
Furthermore, the participants may have been pooled from a high need for
cognition (NFC) population. The website mTurk may attract participants who possess
high NFC, which is defined as an innate motivation and joy for thinking (Shestowsky &
Horowitz, 2004). MTurk requires a noticeable effort on the part of visitors to learn how
to navigate and understand the website. MTurk is not user-friendly because it requires
people to understand its language, which is idiosyncratic to that website (e.g., an “HIT,
Human Intelligence Task, refers to a task with monetary compensation). Furthermore,
although no knowledge of HTML is required to use the website as a participant,
researchers must know basic HTML in order to post their surveys online. It may be the
case that some mTurk participants have also used the website as researchers and have
studied HTML. Thus, mTurk participants are likely to be of a group of people who are
able to learn new terminologies, use technology with some basic HTML, and are willing
to partake in surveys for little money. It can be surmised that mTurk participants are
genuinely motivated to engage in cognitive effort and enjoy the task. Shestowsky and
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Horowitz (2004) examined how high NFC and low NFC mock jurors evaluate the quality
of an argument during deliberations. The researchers found that low NFC participants
are more likely to accurately discriminate between strong and weak arguments, whereas
high NFC participants failed to discriminate between the two. Shestowsky and Horowitz
(2004) reasoned that low NFCs were sensitive to modifying their attitudes on a particular
issue if they believed the argument was stronger than their own beliefs. High NFC
participants, on the other hand, were more likely to believe that their own attitudes were
more compelling than the argument posed to them, whether or not the argument was
strong or weak. Relating these findings to the current study, mTurk participants of high
NFC may have believed that their preexisting attitudes outweighed the value of the expert
testimony, and thus eliminated such testimony for the factors they considered for
rendering a verdict.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis predicted an interaction between jurors’ gender and expert
testimony on verdict outcomes; comparing the BWS to SAF condition, male participants
should have rendered more “Not Guilty” verdicts in the SAF condition, whereas the
change in verdicts from the BWS to SAF condition should not have been as large for
female participants. The results did not support this hypothesis. There was no difference
in verdict decisions across expert testimony conditions. The first hypothesis
demonstrated a difference in female and male verdict decisions, in which men rendered
more punitive verdicts. However, within each gender group, expert testimony type failed
to influence a change in verdict. The lack of significance may indicate that, in reality,
SAF expert testimony does not affect jurors’ decisions differently from BWS expert

Running head: ABUSED WOMEN WHO KILL

33

testimony. As mentioned before, the subjective-objective standard may have contributed
to non-significance by substituting for the effect that any expert testimony would have on
jury decision-making. Particularly, mock jurors may have already been primed to
attempt to empathize with the defendant’s psychosocial circumstances (e.g., the
defendant’s genuine fear for her life) at the time of the crime. Potential high NFC or
tendency to believe in one’s own beliefs over external information may have also
contributed to the lack of an interaction between gender and expert testimony type on
verdict decisions.
Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis proposed an interaction between response history and
expert testimony type on verdict decisions, which was unsupported by the data.
Hypotheses two and three already demonstrated non-significance across expert testimony
types. Passive and active response histories produced no main effects on verdict
decisions. Participants, however, did compare the defendant to the prototypical model of
a battered woman. The typicality scale revealed a significant main effect of defendant
typicality on response history. The main effect revealed that participants in the passive
condition believed the defendant fit the stereotypical image of a battered woman more so
than the participants in the active condition. The results demonstrate that the response
history manipulation successfully affected participants’ perception of the defendant as a
typical battered woman. The passive condition invoked the stereotype of a battered
woman because it drew from the characteristics that BWS claims should manifest in
battered women (e.g., helpless, weak, blaming herself, making excuses for her batterer’s
actions, and fearful). An active response history included behaviors that diverged from
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BWS’s claims, such as fighting back against her abuser, assigning all the blame to him,
trying to make him feel guilty for his actions, trying to leave the house, telling other
people about the abuse, and refusing to quit her job for him. The representativeness
heuristic may account for jurors’ perceptions of typicality. Jurors’ preconceived notions
of a battered woman serves as a subjective representation of all battered women. The
representativeness heuristic enables jurors to quickly categorize the passive defendant as
a battered woman and exclude the active defendant from that category (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Prototype theory further explains that not only do jurors categorize or
exclude defendants under the label of a battered woman, but also jurors evaluate the
defendant’s typicality on a gradient. The more prototypical features that are present in
the defendant, the greater a perceived fit with the prototype (Smith, 1991). Therefore, the
results support the prototype theory.
Yet, the results failed to support an interaction between response history and
expert testimony type on verdict outcomes. Such non-significance may indicate that the
defendant’s response history has no bearing on the verdict itself. Response history’s lack
of influence on verdict may be demonstrated by the participants’ failure to react to
contradictory evidence pertaining to response history. In particular, the BWS expert
witness’s credibility remained unaffected by response history. In the active condition, the
defendant fought back against her batterer, tried to leave the house, and blamed her
batterer and attempted to make him feel guilty for the abuse. The BWS expert witness
stated nearly the opposite of those behaviors: “Dr. Baxter stated that battered women
typically believe that they can change their batterer’s behavior, and Ann believed David’s
promises of change…Ann displayed signs of “learned helplessness,” meaning that over
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time in her relationship with David, Ann learned that resistance to the abuse was futile
and may backfire by provoking further abuse. She was resigned to staying in the
relationship and was submissive to her husband.” Unfortunately, the current study did
not ask participants if they noticed any contradictions between the expert testimony and
the defendant’s past behaviors. The lack of significant findings may be explained by the
prevailing effect of gender and the mediating effect of attitudes toward spousal abuse on
verdict decisions. Perhaps the participants, guided by their preexisting attitudes toward
spousal abuse, unconsciously neglected the contradictory information provided by the
BWS expert witness in order to form a stable image of the defendant. Consequently,
response history may have been filtered out during jurors’ decision-making process.
Hypothesis 5
The fifth hypothesis suggested a meditational model involving an interaction
between response history and expert testimony on verdict decisions, mediated by the
defendant’s typicality. As stated for the fourth hypothesis, there was no significance
found for an interaction between response history and expert testimony. Therefore, no
meditational model could be examined.
Hypothesis 6
The sixth hypothesis predicted a similar meditational model that involved the
interaction between response history and expert testimony on verdict decisions, mediated
by the juror’s perception of expert witness credibility. Again, no significant interaction
was found, and consequently, the proposed meditational model could not be
demonstrated.
Hypothesis 7
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The first hypothesis predicated a main effect of gender on verdict decisions. The
outcome was consistent with this expectation, but the main effect ceased to have a direct
impact on verdict decisions once participants’ predispositional attitudes were considered.
The seventh hypothesis explains this phenomenon. The effect of participants’ gender on
verdict decisions was mediated by their attitudes toward spousal abuse and battered
women.
As explained before, women may hold different memories of domestic violence
than men that are easily accessible because women have a higher probability than men of
experiencing domestic violence to some degree (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009). As a
result, each gender may form divergent attitudes toward spousal abuse. Attitudes in
general affect verdict outcomes, as demonstrated by past research conducted on deathqualified juries. Death-qualified jurors are potential jurors who are willing to impose the
death penalty with sufficient evidence, and excludable jurors are those who would never
vote in favor of the death penalty. Cowan, Thompson, and Ellsworth (1984) studied the
differences in conviction proneness between excludable jurors and death-qualified jurors,
and they found that the latter group is more likely to convict the defendant. This research
touches upon the predispositional attitudes that people hold when they first walk into the
courtroom. Cowan et al.’s (1984) study also revealed that death-qualified jurors are less
likely to stringently apply the reasonable doubt standard and interpret the weight of
evidence differently from excludable jurors. Extending this research to the current study,
women and men (like excludable versus death-qualified jurors) tend to hold different
attitudes toward spousal abuse and battered women. Male and female mock jurors’
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contrasting attitudes may then act as a filter through which they select and interpret
evidence and apply it to the self-defense standard of reasonableness.
Attitudes help shape jurors’ schemas in which they form their expectations for
how spousal abuse occurs and how victims react. Attitudes consist of a person’s
dispositional stance in favor of or against a class of issues or people, in this case a
battered woman. Bem (1981) proposed the gender schema, which explains two different
schematic processing by males and females. A schema is a cognitive network of
associations that organizes and integrates information to form an individual’s perception.
Schemas offer an evolutionary advantage by integrating information efficiently,
excluding irrelevant pieces and highlighting the most relevant ones, into a comprehensive
story. Expanding upon the definition of a schema, Bem (1981) explains a gender schema
as a cognitive “readiness to process information on the basis of sex-linked associations.”
She argues that men and women learn to encode information based on their gendered
experiences. Therefore, male and female jurors, given their respective experiences with
domestic violence, have different cognitive availability of schemas – schemas that are
easily accessed – which leads each gender to hold divergent attitudes toward spousal
abuse. These attitudes serve as an information filter to select (or exclude) evidence from
trial and jurors’ cognitive schemas integrate the selected evidence into a cohesive whole.
Such information filtering results in men and women rendering different verdicts. The
seventh hypothesis thus reiterates the theory that jurors’ attitudes mediate the effect of
other factors, particularly gender, on verdict decisions.
Post-hoc analysis
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A post-hoc exploratory analysis examined whether the juror’s perception of
expert witness credibility affected verdict outcomes, and indeed, a significant main effect
was found. Because the expert witness testified for the defense, the more that jurors
assigned credibility to the expert witness, the more likely the jurors voted in favor of the
defense. The less credible the jurors perceived the expert witness, the more likely jurors
were to render a “Guilty” verdict. This main effect, unfortunately, does not shed light on
how expert testimony affects verdict decisions. Rather, it may reiterate the theory that
jurors hold preexisting attitudes about the case, and if the expert witness’s testimony was
in line with those attitudes, then participants may view that witness as more credible than
if the testimony contradicted their attitudes.
In another exploratory analysis, the current results demonstrated that participants
viewed the expert witness as more credible if that witness’s testimony complimented
jurors’ attitudes toward spousal abuse. In fact, mock jurors’ attitudes accounted for
18.3% of their perception of expert witness credibility. When the expert witness
testimony contradicted jurors’ attitudes, participants viewed the expert witness as less
credible. This finding supports the theory that attitudes act as an information biasing
mechanism, which interprets information according to jurors’ predispositional beliefs.
Age also served as a proxy for jurors’ attitudes. The results revealed that people
under the age of 30 held more biased attitudes against battered women than people over
the age of 30. This finding poses a conundrum because past research reported the
opposite effect: older people tend to hold biased attitudes against battered women than
younger people. For example, Worden and Carlson (2005) surveyed people on their
beliefs about battered women and found that older respondents, more so than younger
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people, accused domestic violence victims of masochism. Curiously, though, that same
study found that younger respondents, more often than older people, believed that
domestic violence victims had more options of escape from abusive relationships. It is
uncertain how to interpret the current findings relating to age and juror attitudes. Perhaps
the mTurk sample included older adults who had more personal experiences with
domestic violence, which contributed to them empathizing more with battered women. If
this were the case, then past research may be correct in that both younger and older
respondents each hold mixed attitudes toward battered women, but an individual’s
personal experience with domestic violence may polarize his or her attitudes, despite age.
Therefore, if the older participants in the current mTurk sample had more of a
relationship to domestic violence, then their attitudes may be more favorable toward
battered women. Unfortunately, because this study did not include a scale measuring
participants’ exposure to domestic violence, the effect of mock jurors’ age on attitudes
remains unexplained.
Limitations and suggestions for future research
The current study instructs participants to render their verdict according to the
burden of proof of the prosecution proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Burden of
proof is the minimum level of persuasion that the prosecution or defense (in this case
only the prosecution) must meet in order to win the verdict. A prosecution’s burden of
proof of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt means that the jury can only find
a “Guilty” verdict if the evidence presented removes all reasonable doubt from the jurors’
minds. Some states, such as Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Virginia, require the
prosecution to exclusively bear the burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt
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(Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 2010; Elkins, 2006). Other states, such as
Maryland, also require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that selfdefense is inappropriate, if and only if the defense raised the issue of self-defense first.
Most states, however, consider self-defense to be an affirmative defense, and
consequently, both the defense and prosecution assume a burden of proof. The burden of
proof is often lower for affirmative defenses, either using clear and convincing evidence
(the evidence must be substantially and more probable to be true than not) or a
preponderance of evidence (the evidence is more likely than not to be true). The current
study adopted Connecticut’s burden of proof, in which the prosecution bears the sole
burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The reason the current study used
the Connecticut burden of proof is because that state provided to the public actual,
verbatim jury instructions, and in an effort to remain ecologically valid, the study
incorporated those publicly available jury instructions. The high burden of proof may
account for the lack of difference between the expert testimony conditions and the control
condition. It may be the case that whether expert testimony was present, mock jurors
may have conceived of at least one reasonable doubt that would invalidate the
prosecution’s case.
In addition, not all states use the subjective-objective standard. Some legal
jurisdictions abide by the objective standard, in which jurors are instructed to determine
whether a reasonable person would have acted in the same way as the battered woman
defendant. Legal scholars have noted judicial responses to the objective test and how
some judges have moved to issuing the subjective-objective standard (Crocker, 1985).
However, no studies have examined whether jurors’ decision-making processes are
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affected by which standard is used. In the current study, expert testimony did not
influence jurors’ verdict decisions, perhaps because they were already primed to attempt
to think from the defendant’s point of view. This priming may have arisen from the
subjective-objective standard, in which jurors were instructed to consider how the
defendant perceived reasonableness and whether that was legitimate given her
circumstances. As a result, the subjective-objective standard may have eliminated any
effects of expert testimony on verdicts decisions that otherwise may have been found if
using the objective standard.
The current study also failed to measure participants’ past exposures to spousal
abuse. In order to more deeply investigate the meditational model involving gender,
attitudes, and verdict outcomes, future research should measure participants’ prior
exposure to domestic violence. This may tap into mock jurors’ cognitive availability of
domestic violence and allow for researchers to find a potential difference between men
and women’s cognitive availability, and also support for the availability heuristic as an
underlying mechanism for this finding.
Furthermore, a scale should have been used to identify how participants weight
the evidence that influenced their verdict. Weighting of evidence is important in
understanding how attitudes affect the value participants assign to each piece of
information. Anderson’s (1971) integration theory describes information processing as
the product of the information’s weight and scale value. The weight is personal
significance the individual assigns to the piece of information, and the scale value
measures the subjective probability that the expected outcome will occur. Attitudes
toward spousal abuse may affect the weight component of the integration model and
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change the jurors’ perception of what evidence most suitably, if at all, applies to the
standard of reasonableness. The current results suggest that participants’ attitudes
predicated their perception of expert witness credibility. Based on this finding, future
studies should test the hypothesis that mock jurors with empathetic attitudes toward
battered women place greater weight on the expert witness testifying for the defendant,
whereas participants with attitudes attributing blame to the battered woman may be more
likely to discount the expert testimony when rendering a verdict. The current study
provides evidence linking attitudes toward perception of credible evidence. The nonsignificant findings for the main effects of expert testimony and response history on
verdict decisions may be reflective of this integration theory; participants’ attitudes may
have served as the overriding influence in weighting evidence. Perhaps jurors’
preexisting attitudes help to strengthen or discredit evidence, regardless of the type of
evidence (e.g., BWS vs. SAF vs. no expert testimony), in order to support their attitudes
toward battered women.
Legal implications
During the process of voir dire, lawyers attempt to remove potential jurors
exhibiting biases that might impede their objective judgment, with particular focus on
jurors that lawyers suspect may render an unfavorable verdict. The current study
demonstrates that gender and attitudes may induce a biasing effect, in which jurors do not
begin trial with predetermined verdicts, but rather with predetermined gender-related
attitudes that filter out certain evidence incongruent to that schema. Lawyers should be
aware of the meditational process of a jurors’ decision-making and use that knowledge to
develop a mechanism, such as a questionnaire, enabling them to identify jurors with
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certain attitudes during voir dire. Identifying attitudes beforehand may lead to balanced
juries, in which there is an equal distribution of attitudes toward battered women in each
jury. Ideally, a more nuanced voir dire process would lead to a fairer trial, further
reducing the possibility of the entire jury being composed of like-minded individuals.
Although no significance was found between the different expert testimony
conditions, any form of expert testimony plays an invaluable role in the courtroom.
Jurors are not as well informed as experts in matters of victims’ responses to domestic
violence. Misinformation about battered women may render jurors unable to find the
defense case reasonable, even when the evidence would suggest the defendant did act
reasonably. For example, Dodge and Greene (1991) compared the knowledge of jurors
and researchers specializing in domestic violence. Their study showed that jurors were
less knowledgeable than experts about characteristics of abusive relationships. For
example, jurors were less informed than researchers about how abusers persuade the
battered woman to stay in a relationship with him (e.g., the abuser promises to never hurt
her again or she feels dependent on him). The same study revealed that jurors were less
likely to believe in the battered woman’s fear of her batterer killing her and in the
necessity of using deadly force to prevent her batterer from killing her. Moreover, jurors
were less able than experts on domestic violence to understand why a battered woman
would blame herself for the abuse and how anxiety and depression may affect the
woman’s ability to effectively cope with the abuse. Given this informational gap
between researchers and jurors, expert testimony is necessary to fill this informational
gap and should thus be included during the defense’s case. The current study suggests
that whether BWS or SAF expert testimony affect jurors’ verdict decisions, lawyers will
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need to utilize some persuasive tool, such as expert testimony, to inhibit (or augment)
jurors’ attitudes toward the defendant. Otherwise, the evidence on its own, without any
interpretation by an expert, may leave jurors to interpret the evidence according to their
own individual attitudinal biases.
The current study used a subjective-objective standard for jurors to evaluate the
reasonablenesss of self-defense. Not all states use this standard, and the current nonsignificant findings might indicate significant implications for the subjective-objective
self-defense standard. One study demonstrated that the subjective definition of
reasonableness has led jurors to render more “Not Guilty” verdicts compared to when the
objective definition was used (i.e., judges instructed jurors to evaluate the defendant’s
actions in the perspective of the average reasonable person) (Follingstad, Shillinglaw,
DeHart, & Kleinfelter, 1997). Although little research has been conducted on the effects
of subjective versus objective definitions of self-defense on verdict outcomes, it may be
the case that when jurors are instructed by the judge to evaluate the defendant’s actions
from the defendant’s point of view, then jurors may be more likely to empathize with the
defendant and render a lenient verdict. If the current study, then, had used an objective
standard without the subjective component, then perhaps participants would have been
more punitive. Consequently, lawyers should be aware of the standards of their local
jurisdictions, and if the self-defense case occurs in an objective standard jurisdiction,
lawyers should attempt to induce an effortful attempt on the part of the jurors to attempt
to understand from the defendant’s perspectives. Such empathy induction might be
encouraged through expert testimony, for example.
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Battered women face a unique dilemma when being evaluated by a jury. They
must present a case that facilitates understanding between the jury and her rendition of
events and enable the jury to empathize with her mental state. Not enough research has
yet been conducted to provide sufficient advice to defense attorneys representing battered
women, but the current research highlights the mediating role of jurors’ preexisting
attitudes and encourages attorneys to pay attention to those attitudes during the jury
selection process.
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Appendix A
Consent Form
I have been invited to take part in a research study to learn more about jurydecision making. This study has been approved by the Claremont McKenna College
Institutional Review Board (IRB). This research study will be conducted by Shahrzad
Nikoo as part of her Bachelor’s thesis work. Her faculty advisor is Dr. Daniel Krauss, a
professor of Psychology at Claremont McKenna College.
I agree to be in this research study and I acknowledge that my participation will
include the following:
1. Completing a questionnaire about my background (age, gender, education, etc.);
2. Reading a trial case transcript concerning a battered women charged with firstdegree homicide;
3. Completing another questionnaire relating to the case transcript, including
rendering my verdict.
This survey will require about one hour of my time. The following information
informs me of the risks of participating: I may find the nature of the topic of battered
women upsetting, and if I do, I will be provided with information on counselors I may
contact. I understand, however, that this is not a real life case and, instead, is a fictional
case that is supposed to reflect true events.
I acknowledge that I may benefit educationally from this study on court cases
involving battered women. It may contribute to scientific knowledge by providing my
answers that may serve to reveal new scientific findings.
[For mTurk participants] I will be paid $.50 for reading the case transcript and
completing the survey. I understand that by receiving payment, my name may be
recorded by Amazon, since it acts as a proxy; however, I also understand that my name
will not be associated with my survey answers, that it will not be used for any purpose,
and that only the researcher can have access to it. In order to receive the payment, I must
be jury-eligible (at least 18 years old, a U.S. citizen, and not have been convicted of a
felony). If I wish, I may print a copy of this consent form for my personal records.
[For Sona Systems participants] I will be compensated for my time with 1 course
credit. In order to receive course credit, I must be jury-eligible (at least 18 years old, a
U.S. citizen, and not have been convicted of a felony).
Confidentiality of my records will be strictly maintained by keeping my name
separate from my answers. Answers will be stored in a password protected website.
I am voluntarily participating in this study. I may refuse to participate, skip any
question, or withdraw at any time without penalty.
If I have any additional questions or wish to report a research-related problem, I
may contact the researcher at (925) 989-0289; snikoo12@cmc.edu; Claremont McKenna
College, 742 N. Amherst Ave, Claremont, CA 91711, or I may contact the supervisor at
(909) 607-8504; dkrauss@cmc.edu; Claremont McKenna College 742 N. Amherst Ave,
Seaman Hall 231, Claremont, CA 91711. For questions about your rights as a research
participant, you may contact the chair of Claremont McKenna College’s Institutional
Review Board, Michael O’Neill at (909) 607-8336, or via email at moneill@cmc.edu.
My checkmark in the box below indicates that I have read and understood all of
the above.
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By checking this box, I agree that I have read this form and consent to
participate in this survey.
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Jury Eligibility
Please read the following criteria for jury-eligibility:
- At least 18 years old
- A United States citizen
- Have never been convicted of a felony
- Proficient English speaker
Do you meet all these requirements?
Yes No
If you selected “No” please do not continue with the survey.
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Appendix C
Please pretend you are a juror. The following pages include a court transcript
with preliminary jury instructions, opening statements, summaries of witness testimonies,
closing statements, and jury instructions.
Please read the following pages carefully as if you were an actual juror in the
case.
Control, Passive Condition
Preliminary Jury Instructions
Ladies and gentleman of the jury:
You have been selected and sworn as the jury to try the case of State v. Ann
Hudson. This is a criminal case. Ms. Hudson is charged with murder in the first degree.
The definition of the elements of first-degree murder will be explained to you later.
It is your solemn responsibility to determine if the State has proved its accusation
beyond a reasonable doubt against Ann Hudson. Your verdict must be based solely on
the evidence, or lack of evidence, and the law.
It is the judge’s responsibility to decide which laws apply to this case and to
explain those laws to you. It is your responsibility to decide what the facts of this case
may be, and to apply the law to those facts. Thus, the province of the jury and the
province of the court are well defined, and they do not overlap. This is one of the
fundamental principles of our system of justice.
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful if you understand how a trial is
conducted. At the beginning of the trial, the attorneys will have an opportunity, f they
wish, to make an opening statement. The opening statement gives the attorneys a chance
to tell you what evidence they believe will be presented during the trial. What the
lawyers say is not evidence, and you are not to consider it as such. Following the
opening statements, witnesses will be called to testify under oath. They will be examined
and cross-examined by the attorneys. After the evidence has been presented, the
attorneys will have the opportunity to make their final argument.
Following the arguments by the attorneys, the court will instruct you on the law
applicable to the case. After the instructions are given, you will then consider your
verdict. You should not form any definite or fixed opinion on the merits of the case until
you have heard all the evidence, the argument of the lawyers, and the instructions on the
law by the judge. Until that time, you should not discuss the case amongst yourselves.
The case must be tried by you only on the evidence presented during the trial in your
presence and in the presence of the defendant, the attorneys, and the judge. Jurors must
not conduct any investigation of their own. In this age of electronic communication, I
want to stress again that just as you must not talk about this case face-to-face, you must
not talk about this case by using an electronic device. Do not discuss this case or ask for
advice by any means at all, including posting information on an Internet website, chat
room, or blog.
Jury instructions have finished and the Court is now ready to hear opening
statements.
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Prosecution Opening Statement
Hello, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. My name is Frederick Jones and I
represent the State in this case. On the night of October 17, 2011, David Hudson invited
his sister and two friends to his house for a casual party. His wife, the defendant Ann
Hudson, got into an argument with her sister-in-law. David became involved in the
argument and he and his wife were yelling at each other. The defendant, enraged, ran up
the stairs and slammed the door to her bedroom. Everyone downstairs could hear her
yelling and banging against the wall. David went upstairs to the bedroom. Then, two
shots were fired. David Hudson was dead. Today, you will hear from Morgan Johnson,
the deceased’s sister who was at the party. She will tell you how the defendant was
yelling in her bedroom for ten whole minutes before David went upstairs. She will tell
you that David looked calm – and not angry – when he was walking upstairs. She will
also tell you that she heard the two shots fired within thirty seconds after David reached
upstairs, one of those bullets having killed David. After presenting this evidence, the
Prosecution will have proven its case that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of first-degree murder.
Defense Opening Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This is not a story of an angry wife killing her
husband in a fit of rage. This is a story of an abused woman acting in self-defense. You
will hear from Ann Hudson herself, who will reveal to you the abuse she has suffered at
the hands of her husband during the five years of their marriage. She will tell you that on
numerous occasions, the abuse was so severe that she required medical attention. Ann
will explain to you how she was too afraid to leave her marriage out of fear that her
husband would track her down and kill her. From her testimony, you will understand that
she had no recourse on the night of October 17, 2011 than to defend herself against her
husband whom she believed wanted to kill her. At the end of this trial, you will see that
the defendant’s action was justified by self-defense and that Ann Hudson is not guilty of
first-degree murder. Thank you.
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The following are summaries of witnesses’ testimonies during direct and crossexaminations. These summaries include all facts that were presented during trial.
Prosecution Case
Direct Examination of Morgan Johnson
Morgan Johnson is David’s sister. She testified that she knew Ann Hudson for
about 10 years even before Ann started dating David. Morgan was invited by David to
his party at his house on the night of October 17, 2011. Morgan arrived at his house
around 10:00PM with three of her friends. She testified that while they were eating
dinner, Morgan told Ann that her cooking was “not up to par and then Ann got really
upset.” Ann yelled at Morgan. Morgan said that she got upset too and they began yelling
at each other.
Morgan further testified that David got involved in the argument. He told Ann
that she should “take my [Morgan’s] criticism constructively” so that she could “do a
better job of cooking dinner in the future. Ann didn’t take too well to that.” Morgan said
that she heard Ann screaming at David that she had tried her best and that David did not
appreciate her effort. Morgan also heard David yell back to Ann that “she takes
everything too personally.”
Morgan saw Ann run upstairs and heard Ann slam a door shut. Morgan testified
to hearing Ann’s muffled yelling through the door. After ten minutes of Ann’s shouting,
David went upstairs. Morgan said that David appeared to have calmed down by that
point and that he said to Morgan, “I guess I should go see her.” Morgan said that at that
point, David appeared calm and collected. David walked upstairs and Morgan heard him
open a door. She did not hear anything for the next few seconds. Morgan said that thirty
seconds later, she heard a gunshot and then another shot. Morgan ran upstairs, went
through the bedroom door, and saw David lying on the ground, face up, in a pool of
blood. Morgan saw Ann in the opposite corner of the room holding a gun, and then
Morgan called the police. Morgan said that David died that night.
Defense Cross Examination of Morgan Johnson
Morgan used to go out socially with Ann before her marriage to David. After the
wedding, Ann refused to engage in social outings and preferred instead to stay at home.
Morgan testified that she never saw Ann with a bruise until after her marriage to David
Johnson. Morgan saw Ann with a new bruise approximately once every two months.
Morgan asked Ann about her bruises, but Ann never told Morgan how she got them.
Morgan said that she “got the feeling that Ann was covering up for someone.” Morgan
said that she has rarely seen Ann and David get into a fight, but the few times that she did
see them argue, Ann always quickly apologized and tried to calm him down. In these
situations, Morgan heard the defendant say, “I’m so stupid. Why do I always do things
that make him angry?” Morgan has never heard Ann yell at David until the night of his
death.
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Defense Case
Direct Examination of Ann Hudson
Ann testified that during the five years of her marriage to David Johnson, David
had abused her. Ann said that their relationship began without violence for the first few
months, but then David became increasingly more aggressive toward her. He frequently
grew upset when she asked him if she could go out with her friends or family, if she did
not cook the way he liked, or if she did not want to have sexual intercourse with him.
During their verbal arguments he called Ann a “bitch” and “whore.” Ann testified that
during physical altercations, David punched Ann in her stomach and chest, slapped her
across the face, and grabbed her by the arms and shook her vigorously. Ann said that
during one incident in 2010, David pinned her against the wall and choked her, and then
he threw her onto the couch. Ann went to the hospital the next day complaining of
dizziness and an intense headache. She said that the doctor told her she had a concussion.
Ann did not tell David that she had a concussion because she “did not want to make him
feel bad.”
Ann testified that there were times when David told her, “You make me want to
kill you.” Ann said that she feared for her life when David was angry, but believed that
he had no control over his anger and that she should not provoke him. Ann said that she
has been feeling depressed during the majority of their marriage and was “overwhelmed
with guilt” for every time she had caused a fight. In the year 2009, she told her mother
about the abuse, and her mother convinced Ann to move out of the house. However, Ann
testified that, in the end, she did not move out of the house because when David found
out about her plans, he became enraged and threatened Ann, saying that if she left, he
would “hunt her down and kill her and then come after her mother.” Ann testified that
she was too afraid of provoking David to leave the relationship.
Ann said that David was her only friend since she never went out socially with
other people. Ann said that David grew jealous whenever she would leave with other
people, so she stopped. Ann also testified that she did not get herself a job because David
insisted that she stay at home and leave the finances up to David.
Ann said that on the night of October 17, 2011, Ann had become angry with
Morgan Johnson because Morgan had criticized her cooking. Ann and Morgan got into a
verbal fight. David intervened and told Ann to not “take everything so personally.” Ann
ran upstairs, upset, into her bedroom and slammed the door shut. Through the closed
door, Ann continued to shout about how she had tried her best but no one appreciated her
efforts. Eventually, David opened the bedroom door. Ann testified that David had “the
same look on his face as when he had choked [her]” in 2010. Ann believed that he was
about to violently attack and kill her, so she pulled out David’s gun that she knew he kept
in the bedroom closet. David took a few quick steps toward Ann and then Ann shot the
gun once, missing David. He lunged toward her but she shot him in the head and he fell
to the ground. Ann testified that she was terrified and ran to the corner of the room.
Morgan Johnson entered the room and called the police.
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Prosecution Cross Examination of Ann Hudson
Ann admitted that after David had choked her in 2010, she did not leave her
husband. Ann testified that she did not see leaving the relationship as an option of
escape, and so she never did successfully leave.
Ann testified that on the night of David’s death, David never threatened that he
was going to kill her. Ann admitted that when David was in the bedroom with her, she
did not scream even though she knew there were other people in the house. Ann said that
for a few years now she knew that David kept a gun in the bedroom closet. Ann admitted
that she was angry when she was in the bedroom and that she had been shouting for ten
minutes before David entered. She had been yelling before then as well while Morgan
and David were downstairs. Ann admitted that, on the night of October 17, 2011, David
did not raise his hand to hit her, he did not have a weapon in his hand, and he did not
have his hands formed into fists. Ann stated that when she saw the look on David’s face,
she “knew [she] had to shoot him to stop him.”
Defense Closing Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This case is not a case of malicious murder.
This is a case of self-defense. First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan
Johnson. During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their
marriage, David would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife. Ann Hudson did
not know what to do. She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to
leave, but David threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother. She was too afraid to
leave. So, she did the only thing she knew she could do within those few seconds, when
David was walking toward her with the look that indicated he was going to kill her.
Without thinking, she grabbed the gun that was in the closet nearby and shot him out of
self-defense. When you deliberate today, remember that an act of self-defense is defined
as a reasonable response to an imminent harm and that the response used proportional
force to that imminent harm. Ann Hudson had no alternative she knew of. She acted to
save her own life. Thank you.
Prosecution Closing Argument
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This is not merely a case of malicious murder.
It is a case of premeditated murder. You heard from Morgan Johnson, who was present
at David Johnson’s house on the night of October 17, 2011, say that the defendant was
irritable. She was yelling at her sister-in-law, then at her husband David, then stormed
upstairs, slammed her door shut, and continued to shout in the bedroom. For ten whole
minutes she was in that room. For ten whole minutes she had time to think of her next
move, and she did. She told you that she thought of shooting him before she pulled that
trigger. When David Johnson walked up the stairs and reached the bedroom door, it took
only thirty seconds for Ann Hudson to fire the gun. Twice. During cross-examination of
the defendant, she told you that she knew there were other people in the house. If she
were truly afraid of her husband, a more reasonable response than shooting David would
have been to call out for help. She had other options than to killing David. As the
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prosecution, we bear the burden in the case. It is up to us to prove to you beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ann Hudson deliberately and with premeditation shot and killed
her husband. Self-defense is defined as a reasonable person’s response, with proportional
force, to an imminent harm. You must ask yourself if the defendant acted reasonably and
used proportionate force. When you do, I am sure you will come back with a guilty
verdict. Thank you.
Jury Instructions
First Degree Murder
To prove the crime of First Degree Murder, the State must prove the following
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. David Johnson is dead.
2. The death was caused by the criminal act of Ann Hudson.
3. There was a premeditated killing of Ann Hudson.
Definitions.
“Killing with premeditation” is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The
decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The law does not fix the
exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated intent to
kill and the killing. The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.
The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by you from
the evidence. It will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the circumstances of the
killing and the conduct of the accused convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of premeditation at the time of the killing.
Self-Defense
After you have considered all of the evidence in this case, if you find that the state
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of first degree murder, you must go
on to consider whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.
A person is justified in the use of force against another person that would
otherwise be illegal if she is acting in self-defense. It is a complete defense to first degree
murder.
There is a statute that defines self-defense and you are to apply that definition in
reviewing evidence in this case. The statute defining self-defense reads as follows: a
person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend
herself from what she reasonably believes to be the use of imminent use of physical
force, and she may use such degree of force which she reasonably believes to be
necessary for such purpose.
Reasonable Beliefs.
You must consider whether the defendant justifiably acted in self-defense. The
test you are to apply is a subjective-objective test, meaning that it has some subjective
aspects and some objective aspects. You must first consider the situation from the
perspective of the defendant; that is, what did the defendant actually believe as best as
can be inferred from the evidence. This is the subjective aspect of the test. The statute
requires, however, that the defendant’s belief be reasonable, and not irrational or
unreasonable under the circumstances; that is, would a reasonable person in the
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defendant’s circumstances have reached that belief. This is the objective aspect of the
test.
Self-defense has four elements:
1. The defendant actually believed that the other person (1) was using or about to
use deadly physical force against her, or (2) was inflicting or about to inflict great
bodily harm upon her.
2. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant’s
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant’s perspective,
would have shared that belief.
3. The defendant actually believed that deadly physical force was necessary to repel
the attack.
4. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant’s
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant’s perspective,
would have shared that belief.
Verdict
The defendant has no burden of proof regarding any of these elements. Instead,
the State bears the sole and exclusive burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant did not act in self-defense, a burden it can meet by disproving at least one
of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
If you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any o the
elements of first-degree murder, you shall then find the defendant not guilty and not
consider the defense.
If you find that all the elements of first-degree murder have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, you shall then consider the defense. If you find that the State has
disproved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the elements of the defense, you
must reject that defense and find the defendant guilty.
If, on the other hand, you find that the State has not disproved beyond a
reasonable doubt at least one of the elements of the defense, then on the strength of that
defense alone you must find the defendant not guilty despite the fact that you have found
the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
You are now released to deliberate and render your verdict.
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Appendix D
Control, Active Condition
Everything is the same as the “Control, Passive” condition except for the crossexamination of Morgan Johnson, the direct examination of Ann Hudson, and the Defense
and Prosecution closing statements. The changes are underlined:
Defense Cross Examination of Morgan Johnson
Morgan went out socially with Ann both before and during her marriage to David.
During her marriage, Ann told Morgan that Ann had to “sneak out of the house without
David knowing” to be able to go see her friends. Morgan testified that she never saw
Ann with a bruise until after her marriage to David Johnson. Morgan saw Ann with a
new bruise approximately once every two months. Morgan asked Ann about her bruises
and Ann told her that David hit her. Morgan said that she “figured Ann could take care
of herself.” Morgan said that she had rarely seen Ann and David get into a fight, but the
few times that she did see them argue, Ann and David would always yell and push each
other. In these situations, Morgan heard the defendant yell, “You’re always causing these
fights! I don’t deserve this!” Morgan stated that Ann “seemed like a prideful woman.”
Defense Case
Direct Examination of Ann Hudson
Ann testified that during the five years of her marriage to David Johnson, David
had abused her. Ann said that their relationship began without violence for the first few
months, but then David became increasingly more aggressive toward her. He frequently
grew upset when she asked him if she could go out with her friends or family, if she did
not cook the way he liked, or if she did not want to have sexual intercourse with him.
During their verbal arguments he called Ann a “bitch” and “whore.” Ann testified that
during physical altercations, David punched Ann in her stomach and chest, slapped her
across the face, and grabbed her by the arms and shook her vigorously. Ann said that
during one incident in 2010, David pinned her against the wall and choked her, and then
he threw her onto the couch. Ann went to the hospital the next day complaining of
dizziness and an intense headache. She said that the doctor told her she had a concussion.
Ann told David about the concussion and told him that it was “all his fault” and that “he
should feel guilty” for what he did.
Ann testified that there were times when David told her, “You make me want to
kill you.” Ann said that she feared for her life when David was angry, and that he
deliberately wanted to intimidate and threaten her. Ann said that she has been feeling
frustrated during the majority of their marriage and felt trapped. In the year 2009, she
told her mother about the abuse, and her mother tried to help Ann to move out of the
house. However, Ann testified that, in the end, she did not move out of the house
because when David found out about her plans, he became enraged and threatened Ann,
saying that if she left, he would “hunt her down and kill her and then come after her
mother.” Ann also tried calling the police on several occasions in the years 2009 and
2010, but again, David threatened her, saying, “If you get me thrown in jail, I’ll be free
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eventually and that’s when I’ll get you.” Ann testified that she was too afraid of what
David might do to her if she left the relationship.
Ann said that David grew jealous whenever she would leave with other people, so
she started “sneaking out the house without David knowing.” Ann also testified that
David insisted that she quit her job as a bank teller so that she could stay at home, but
Ann resisted.
Ann said that on the night of October 17, 2011, Ann had become angry with
Morgan Johnson because Morgan had criticized her cooking. Ann and Morgan got into a
verbal fight. David intervened and told Ann to not “take everything so personally.” Ann
ran upstairs, upset, into her bedroom and slammed the door shut. Through the closed
door, Ann continued to shout about how she had tried her best but no one appreciated her
efforts. Eventually, David opened the bedroom door. Ann testified that David had “the
same look on his face as when he had choked [her]” in 2010. Ann believed that he was
about to violently attack and kill her, so she pulled out David’s gun that she knew he kept
in the bedroom closet. David took a few quick steps toward Ann and then Ann shot the
gun once, missing David. He lunged toward her but she shot him in the head and he fell
to the ground. Ann testified that she was terrified and ran to the corner of the room.
Morgan Johnson entered the room and called the police.

Defense Closing Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This case is not a case of malicious murder.
This is a case of self-defense. First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan
Johnson. During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their
marriage, David would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife. Ann Hudson did
not know what to do. She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to
leave, but David threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother. Ann also tried calling the
police, but David threatened her that eventually when he would have gotten out of prison,
he would have come after Ann. She was too afraid to leave. So, she did the only thing
she knew she could do within those few seconds, when David was walking toward her
with the look that indicated he was going to kill her. Without thinking, she grabbed the
gun that was in the closet nearby and shot him out of self-defense. When you deliberate
today, remember that an act of self-defense is defined as a reasonable response to an
imminent harm and that the response used proportional force to that imminent harm.
Ann Hudson had no alternative she knew of. She acted to save her own life. Thank you.
Prosecution Closing Argument
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This is not merely a case of malicious murder.
It is a case of premeditated murder. You heard from Morgan Johnson, who was present
at David Johnson’s house on the night of October 17, 2011, say that the defendant was
irritable and aggressive. She was yelling at her sister-in-law, then at her husband David,
then stormed upstairs, slammed her door shut, and continued to shout in the bedroom.
For ten whole minutes she was in that room. For ten whole minutes she had time to think
of her next move, and she did. She told you that she thought of shooting him before she
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pulled that trigger. When David Johnson walked up the stairs and reached the bedroom
door, it took only thirty seconds for Ann Hudson to fire the gun. Twice. During crossexamination of the defendant, she told you that she knew there were other people in the
house. If she were truly afraid of her husband, a more reasonable response than shooting
David would have been to call out for help. She had other options than to killing David.
As the prosecution, we bear the burden in the case. It is up to us to prove to you beyond
a reasonable doubt that Ann Hudson deliberately and with premeditation shot and killed
her husband. Self-defense is defined as a reasonable person’s response, with proportional
force, to an imminent harm. You must ask yourself if the defendant acted reasonably and
used proportionate force. When you do, I am sure you will come back with a guilty
verdict. Thank you.
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Appendix E
Passive, BWS Condition
Everything is the same as the “Control, Passive” condition except for the Defense
opening statement, direct and cross-examination of the expert witness, and the Defense
closing statement. The changes are underlined:
Defense Opening Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This is not a story of an angry wife killing her
husband in a fit of rage. This is a story of an abused woman acting in self-defense. You
will hear from Ann Hudson herself, who will reveal to you the abuse she has suffered at
the hands of her husband during the five years of their marriage. She will tell you that on
numerous occasions, the abuse was so severe that she required medical attention. Ann
will explain to you how she was too afraid to leave her marriage out of fear that her
husband would track her down and kill her. You will then hear from Dr. Baxter, a
specialized psychologist, who will tell you that Ann’s behavior suggested she suffered
from Battered Woman Syndrome. Dr. Baxter will testify that Ann could not have
believed she could escape from her relationship with David. From the doctor’s and
Ann’s testimonies, you will understand that she had no recourse on the night of October
17, 2011 than to defend herself against her husband whom she believed wanted to kill
her. At the end of this trial, you will see that the defendant’s action was justified by selfdefense and that Ann Hudson is not guilty of first-degree murder. Thank you.
Defense Direct Examination of Dr. Baxter
Dr. Baxter is a psychologist specializing in the counseling and treatment of
battered women with publications in numerous journals and presentations at several
conferences. Dr. Baxter has been working with victims of domestic violence for the past
20 years. The doctor has conducted extensive research on the dynamics of battering and
its impact on women. In the present case, Dr. Baxter has interviewed Ann Hudson for a
period of three hours and reviewed Ann’s medical history. The psychologist testified that
Ann’s behavior leading up to the shooting was consistent with Battered Woman
Syndrome. Ann experienced the “cycle of abuse” like most battered women. The cycle
consists of three stages: tension-building, acute battering, and loving and remorse. First,
as Dr. Baxter testified, there was the “tension-building” phase, in which Ann’s husband
David committed multiple minor incidents of abuse against her. Second, the “acute
battering” phase followed, which was when David choked Ann and threw her. Third, the
“loving and remorse” phase occurred when David apologized to Ann and promised to
never hurt her again. Dr. Baxter stated that battered women typically believe that they
can change their batterer’s behavior, and Ann believed David’s promises of change. The
cycle of abuse repeats itself until the relationship ends. Dr. Baxter testified that Ann
displayed signs of “learned helplessness,” meaning that Ann believed that resistance to
the abuse was futile. She was resigned to staying in the relationship and was submissive
to her husband.
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Dr. Baxter stated that the battered woman, such as Ann, is always in a state of
fear. The violence does not need to be constant since the threat is always there. Battered
women believe that their batterer can be dangerous at any time. For Ann, trying to leave
the relationship is anxiety-provoking because of David’s threats on her life if she were to
leave. Ann, in accordance with Battered Woman Syndrome, had developed a heightened
sensitivity to her husband’s violence. Battered women can typically predict the onset of
an attack before a blow is ever struck.
Prosecution Cross-Examination of Dr. Baxter
Dr. Baxter conceded that different people respond differently to similar situations.
The psychologist stated that battered women respond in a variety of ways. Most battered
women do not kill their abusers and some women escape their abusive relationships
successfully.
Defense Closing Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This case is not a case of malicious murder.
This is a case of self-defense. First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan
Johnson. During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their
marriage, David would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife. Ann Hudson did
not know what to do. She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to
leave, but David threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother. She was too afraid to
leave. According to Dr. Baxter, Ann’s behavior indicated that she suffered from Battered
Woman’s Syndrome. She was conditioned to be helpless and was put through the misery
of enduring a long cycle of violence. She became sensitive to predicting when her
husband would explode with rage. Ann knew what to expect on the night of October 17,
2011. So, she did the only thing she knew she could do within those few seconds, when
David was walking toward her with the look that indicated he was going to kill her.
Without thinking, she grabbed the gun that was in the closet nearby and shot him out of
self-defense. When you deliberate today, remember that an act of self-defense is defined
as a reasonable response to an imminent harm and that the response used proportional
force to that imminent harm. Ann Hudson had no alternative she knew of. She acted to
save her own life. Thank you.
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Appendix F
Active, BWS Condition
This condition is the same as the “Control, Active” condition, except also with the
changes presented in the “Passive, BWS” condition.
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Appendix G
Passive, SAF Condition
Everything is the same as the “Control, Passive” condition except for the Defense
opening statement, direct and cross-examination of the expert witness, and the Defense
closing statement:
Defense Opening Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This is not a story of an angry wife killing her
husband in a fit of rage. This is a story of an abused woman acting in self-defense. You
will hear from Ann Hudson herself, who will reveal to you the abuse she has suffered at
the hands of her husband during the five years of their marriage. She will tell you that on
numerous occasions, the abuse was so severe that she required medical attention. Ann
will explain to you how she was too afraid to leave her marriage out of fear that her
husband would track her down and kill her. You will then hear from Dr. Baxter, a
specialized psychologist, who will tell you that Ann did not have the social agency to find
options of escape. Dr. Baxter will testify that Ann could not have seen any immediate
options of escape from her relationship with David. From the psychologist’s and Ann’s
testimonies, you will understand that she had no recourse on the night of October 17,
2011 than to defend herself against her husband whom she believed wanted to kill her. At
the end of this trial, you will see that the defendant’s action was justified by self-defense
and that Ann Hudson is not guilty of first-degree murder. Thank you.
Defense Direct Examination of Dr. Baxter
Dr. Baxter is a psychologist specializing in the counseling and treatment of
abused women with publications in numerous journals and presentations at several
conferences. Dr. Baxter has been working with victims of domestic violence for the past
20 years. The doctor has conducted extensive research on the dynamics of battering and
its impact on women. In the present case, Dr. Baxter has interviewed Ann Hudson for a
period of three hours and reviewed Ann’s medical history. The psychologist testified that
due to Ann’s limited resources, she was unable to perceive any options of escape before
the shooting. Dr. Baxter called this the “social-agency framework,” which explores the
abused woman’s social and financial circumstances to determine her ability to leave her
husband. In Ann’s case, Dr. Baxter stated that her husband David regulated the
household’s financial income through their shared bank account. He gave Ann a monthly
allowance that only large enough for her to buy groceries and run other errands. David
also persuaded Ann to not attend college, which prevented her from attaining a higherlevel job with a larger income. Dr. Baxter noted that in terms of social limitations, David
refused to allow Ann to see her friends and family. David would become jealous
whenever Ann went out, accusing her of cheating. Dr. Baxter testified that to Ann, the
police were of no help either, because she was afraid that if she did call the police, then
her husband would kill her.
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Dr. Baxter stated that due to her limited social and financial resources, Ann
believed she was trapped in the relationship and was always in a state of fear. The
violence does not need to be constant since the threat is always there.
Prosecution Cross-Examination of Dr. Baxter
Dr. Baxter conceded that different people respond differently to similar situations.
The psychologist stated that abused women respond in a variety of ways. Most abused
women do not kill their husbands and some women escape their abusive relationships
successfully.
Defense Closing Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. This case is not a case of malicious murder. This is a
case of self-defense. First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan Johnson.
During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their marriage, David
would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife. Ann Hudson did not know what
to do. She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to leave, but David
threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother. She was too afraid to leave. According to
Dr. Baxter, Ann was trapped in her abusive relationship because she lacked the social and
financial resources to escape. She could not support herself financially since David
controlled the household’s finances and prevented her from furthering her education.
David also threatened her to stay away from her friends, family, and the police. She was
stuck in a house of reoccurring violence. So, she did the only thing she knew she could
do within those few seconds, when David was walking toward her with the look that
indicated he was going to kill her. Without thinking, she grabbed the gun that was in the
closet nearby and shot him out of self-defense. When you deliberate today, remember
that an act of self-defense is defined as a reasonable response to an imminent harm and
that the response used proportional force to that imminent harm. Ann Hudson had no
alternative she knew of. She acted to save her own life. Thank you.
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Appendix H
Active, SAF Condition
This condition is the same as the “Control, Active” condition, except also with the
changes presented in the “Passive, SAF” condition.
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Appendix I
Attitudes toward Spousal Abuse and Battered Women Scale
Instructions: This is a questionnaire to determine your attitudes and beliefs on a legal
issue. Please answer each statement by giving as true a picture of your own position as
possible. Please complete the survey by using the following options:
Women can leave abusive relationships if they really wanted to.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Battered women are masochists; they like to be hit.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Women often provoke attacks in abusive relationships.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Successful women can be targets of abuse by their husbands.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Battered women get what they deserve.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Battering only occurs in lower-class families.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Strong religious beliefs will prevent abuse from occurring.
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5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

If a battered woman called the police, she would not have a problem anymore.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

If women would stand up for themselves, they would not be abused.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

A man should be able to run his household as he pleases.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Battered women are usually uneducated and have few job skills.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

The police do not care about domestic violence.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

It is okay for a man to hit his wife if he has a good reason.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

If violence has been used once in a relationship, there is a potential that it will be used
again.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

Trying to leave her husband may bring about further abuse to the woman.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Abused women stay with their husbands because they are dependent on them.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Women in abusive relationships can tell when further abuse will occur.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Abused women have good reason to believe their husbands may eventually kill them.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Women who kill their husbands have exhausted all other possibilities.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

In any situation, there are alternatives to murder.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Self-defense is justification for use of deadly force.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

There are times when defendants charged with murder should be found not guilty.
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5

6

7

Strongly Agree
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Appendix J
Response History Scale
The defendant has low self-esteem.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

The defendant was confrontational.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

The defendant blames herself for the abuse.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

The defendant is a passive woman.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

The defendant told other people about her husband abusing her.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

The defendant was submissive to her husband.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

The defendant often fought back against her husband.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly Agree
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Appendix K
Typicality Scale
Did you find that the defendant, in any way, resembled a normal battered woman?
Yes

No

Does the defendant’s behavior fit with the behavior of a typical battered woman?
1
No fit at all

2

3

4

5

Somewhat a fit

6

7
Perfect fit
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Appendix L
Witness Credibility Scale
Instructions: Please rate the expert witness for the following items on the scale provided:
Not at all trustworthy
1

2

Very Trustworthy
3

4

5

6

Not at all truthful
1

2

Very Truthful
3

4

5

6

Not at all dependable
1

2

2

3

4

5

6

2

3

4

5

6

2

3

4

5

6

2

7

Very Informed
3

4

5

6

Not at all logical
1

7

Very Reliable

Not at all informed
1

7

Very Honest

Not at all reliable
1

7

Very Dependable

Not at all honest
1

7

7

Very Logical
3

4

5

6

7
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Not at all educated
1

2

Very Educated
3

4

5

6

Not at all credible
1

2

Very Credible
3

4

5

6

Not at all wise
1

2

2

7

Very Wise
3

4

5

6

Not at all scientific
1

7

7

Very Scientific
3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix M
Self-defense scale
The defendant believed that her husband was about to inflict great bodily harm or kill her.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

The defendant's belief in imminent harm was reasonable.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly Agree

The defendant believed that deadly force was necessary to repel her husband's attack.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

The defendant's belief in deadly force being necessary was reasonable.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

The defendant had more reasonable options than killing her husband.
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly Agree
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Appendix N
Verdict Confidence Scale
Select which verdict you would give to Ann Hudson:
Guilty

Not Guilty

How confident are you in your verdict?
1
Not Confident

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very Confident
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Appendix O
Demographics questionnaire
Was there an expert witness in this case scenario?
Yes No
If so, did the expert witness say that Ann Hudson’s behavior was consistent with
Battered Woman Syndrome?
Yes No
Please select your sex:

Male

Female

What is your ethnicity? __________________
Are you married?

Yes

No

What is your age? ____________
Have you ever been called for jury duty before?
If so, did you serve on a jury?
Yes
If so, was it a criminal or civil trial?

Yes
No

No

Criminal

Civil
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Appendix P
Debriefing Form
Thank you for your participation. This study analyzes the effectiveness of certain
kinds of self-defense cases for battered women who kill their husbands. This information
will lead to the development of effective methods to help jurors understand the unique
predicament that battered women face.
If you feel uncomfortable with the information that was presented in the case
transcript, you may seek counseling services to help minimize your discomfort. In the
Claremont colleges, you may call the Monsour Counseling and Psychological Services at
(909) 621-8202. For elsewhere, please look up your local counseling centers, or if you
need help in finding such services, you may contact the research at snikoo12@cmc.edu.
In the event that you wish to express concern about this study, please contact one of the
following:
Dr. Daniel Krauss (dkrauss@cmc.edu);
Dr. Shana Levin (slevin@cmc.edu)
If you are interested in learning about the results of the study, feel free to email
the researcher at snikoo12@cmc.edu. If you would like to learn more about self-defense
cases for battered women, you may refer to the book Forensic and Legal Psychology by
Mark Costanzo and Daniel Krauss.
Please refrain from discussing this survey and the case transcript with anyone
until after April of 2011. It is vital for participants to not be aware of the information in
this study before they take the survey. By not knowing about the study’s materials before
hand, participants’ answers will more likely reflect their true, and not biased, responses.
Your participation is much appreciated!
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APPENDIX Q
Mediational models
Model 1:
Defendant
typicality

Response history
x expert
testimony type

Verdict
confidence

Model 2:
Expert
witness
credibility

Response history
x expert
testimony type

Verdict
confidence

Running head: ABUSED WOMEN WHO KILL

84

Model 3:
Attitudes
toward
spousal abuse

Gender

Verdict
confidence
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Appendix R
Full mediation model
Attitudes
toward
spousal abuse

r= .34

r= ..32

Gender
r= .14

Verdict
confidence

